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Abstract 
Digital forensics relates to the investigation of a crime or other suspect behaviour 
using digital evidence. Previous work has dealt with the forensic reconstruction of 
computer-based activity on single hosts, but with the additional complexity involved 
with a distributed environment, a Web services-centric approach is required. A 
framework for this type of forensic examination needs to allow for the reconstruction 
of transactions spanning multiple hosts, platforms and applications. A tool 
implementing such an approach could be used by an investigator to identify scenarios 
of Web services being misused, exploited, or otherwise compromised. This 
information could be used to redesign Web services in order to mitigate identified 
risks. This paper explores the requirements of a framework for performing effective 
forensic examinations in a Web services environment. This framework will be 
necessary in order to develop forensic tools and techniques for use in service 
oriented architectures. 
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Introduction 
Service oriented architectures and Web services facilitate the integration of enterprise 
applications between businesses and government organisations. The cost of 
integration and enhanced flexibility is increased complexity. As more organisations 
adopt Web services for increasingly sensitive, mission-critical data the potential 
impact of breaches of Web services increases both for individuals and organisations. 
Increasing impacts can result in a worsening of the risk environment for all parties. 
Web services security and auditing is therefore an important concern.  
The services oriented architecture paradigm presents a number of significant 
challenges with respect to the auditing and monitoring of transactions. The need to 
provide tools which can aid in the forensic investigation of breaches of security, 
deliberate or accidental, in such an environment is obvious. Such techniques increase 
the possibility of detection and apprehension of criminal actors and aid in assurance 
of the transaction process for all involved. An increased level of assurance of such 
systems should ease concerns with the utilisation of Web services technologies, thus 
opening opportunities for government, business and individuals. 
In this paper we explain how digital forensics can contribute to the security and 
assurance of service oriented architectures, improving the confidence of stakeholders, 
and reducing the confidence of potential attackers that they may act undetected and 
unidentified. We discuss challenges in forensic investigations involving Web 
services, describe how they can be overcome, and we identify the need for a 
framework for developing Web services which record enough evidence to support 
post-hoc investigation. Finally we discuss directions for future forensics research in 
the field of service oriented architectures, and draw conclusions. 
Related Work 
Service Oriented Architecture and Web Services 
Service oriented architecture describes a paradigm for the development, deployment 
and use of online software systems working on the basis of a service provider 
publishing a description of the services it can provide in a form of registry, which is 
queried by clients in order to discover and then dynamically invoke the desired 
services (Hashimi 2003). In this paper we shall use the abbreviation SOA both to 
refer to the paradigm and to specific systems implementing it. This paper focuses on 
Web services, the best known examples of SOAs, in which the mechanism of 
publication, discovery and invocation is facilitated through the use of standard Web 
formats and protocols (World Wide Web Consortium 2004).  
There are at least two participants in any SOA transaction – the service provider and 
the service requester. Both are software agents, representing different individuals or 
organisations (or perhaps different sections of the same organisation). A given service 
requester may not know which service provider has the desired service; it simply 
knows which service it requires, and interrogates the registries of known service 
Recent advances in security technology 
 358 
providers to find the service. The service requester can then select its desired service 
and invoke it.  
Web services use Internet standardised technologies such as XML to implement a 
platform independent and interoperable SOA. A Web service has an interface 
described in a machine-processable format called Web Service Description Language 
(WSDL). This WSDL interface defines the message formats, datatypes, transport 
protocols, and serialisation formats which a Web service requester should use when it 
interacts with the Web service. It is, in essence an agreement not dissimilar to the 
contract programming model of agreed specifications of APIs, except it is machine-
processable and thus machine-enforceable (Jones 2005). In practice, many Web 
service clients are configured with pointers to the WSDL describing the services a 
company wishes to provide. The initial vision of the SOA community was that Web 
service requesters would obtain the WSDL for a Web service through querying the 
Web service provider’s Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) 
registry (OASIS 2004). Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) is used as the 
message format for messages between the Web service requester and the provider, 
consisting of formatted XML requests and XML responses. Through the use of these 
standard formats for the registry, the interface, and messages, any conforming 
software agent, no matter the language in which it was written or the platform for 
which it was written, can take the place of the provider or the requester. 
Authentication 
Management 
Cryptographic Denial of 
Service 
Hijacking Information 
Disclosure 
Infrastructure Misconfiguration Race 
Condition 
Input 
Manipulation 
Other 
Table 1. Categories of vulnerability to attack in Web services!
Web services (and SOAs more generally) are vulnerable to a variety of attacks. In the 
table above we list some broad categories of vulnerability to attack, adapted from 
(Yu, Aravind and Supthaweesuk 2006). While a detailed discussion of each of these 
categories is out of the scope of this particular work, the need to facilitate the 
investigation of Web services is obvious. 
Computer Forensics 
The term computer forensics describes the discovery, examination and analysis of 
digital evidence typically stored on or generated by a computer or computer system. 
Computer forensics is “the investigation of situations where there is computer-based 
(digital) or electronic evidence of a crime or suspicious behaviour” (Mohay, 
Anderson, Collie, de Vel and McKemmish 2003). Investigations of breaches of 
security or suspicious events in, or transaction auditing of SOAs, would employ 
digital evidence in an effort to reconstruct the events under investigation. The 
distributed nature of SOAs poses particular challenges to forensic investigations, but 
the standards-driven nature of SOAs also provides an opportunity to address those 
challenges. 
Forensic Challenges in Service Oriented Architectures 
 359 
The challenges faced in forensic investigations of SOAs include challenges faced in 
forensic investigations of any distributed network system. In conventional computer 
forensic investigations of stand-alone computer systems, there is one primary source 
of digital evidence – the computer’s hard disk. In network forensics, there are a 
number of different potential sources of digital evidence. However, the technical 
difficulty and expense involved in recording large volumes of network data, coupled 
with the lack of economic incentive to collect such information, means that the wider 
variety of potential sources does not translate into a larger volume of digital evidence. 
In fact, most network forensic systems are highly ad hoc in nature, depending on 
network eavesdropping tools such as packet capture software to monitor key points in 
the network (Shanmugasundaram, Brönnimann and Memon 2005). There are 
significant technical challenges in accurately reconstructing network traffic through 
analysing the recordings of such eavesdropping tools even in ideal circumstances. 
Eavesdropping tools are also vulnerable to simple confusion techniques making it 
easy for an attacker to deliberately obfuscate their actions (Cronin, Sherr and Blaze 
2006).  
Regardless of the difficulty of undertaking forensic investigations in a distributed 
network environment it is nevertheless desirable to have the capability. The following 
section outlines one set of rationales for building such capabilities. 
The Necessity of Forensics 
The relationship between forensics and overall system security is harder to see than 
the direct relationship seen between, for example, a firewall and network security. No 
security system is perfect however and herein lies one of the important roles of 
forensics. Robust and accurate forensic techniques increase the likelihood both of 
detection of malfeasance and final attribution of the illicit actions to the perpetrator.  
There is no suggestion at present that the use of Web services provides a new set of 
actual criminal aims. It may, however, provide a new set of ways that criminal acts 
may be committed. The set of influences that may contribute to an adversary’s 
decision to act is complex. Once a target is defined for any attack an adversary will 
require some set of capabilities and resources to undertake the attack (Parker, Shaw, 
Strotz, Devost and Sachs 2004). The nature of the system itself and the security 
measures in place will to a large extent determine these requirements. Simply having 
the capability and resources to act does not make the action inevitable. A combination 
of factors such as perceived benefit, level of potential punishment, and so on will 
come into play before any actor will take action.  
It may not necessarily follow that an adversary will perceive a system with a high 
degree of security measures in place as a higher risk target. Ideally, however, the aim 
is to make the system both difficult to attack and to increase the attacker’s perception 
of risk in attacking the system. Various studies of risk perceptions have identified the 
affect heuristic as a factor in determining the level of perceived risk for some action 
or event. If the potential benefit is high then risk is inferred to be lower, and if risk is 
perceived as low then the benefit is seen as higher. If, however, the benefit is seen as 
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low then the risk is perceived as higher and if risk is perceived as higher then benefit 
is perceived as lower (Peters, Burraston and Mertz 2004). Perception of likelihood of 
detection and consequent identification have also been identified as possible 
modifiers on the behaviour of potential adversaries (Parker, Shaw, Strotz, Devost and 
Sachs 2004). Therefore the role of digital forensics is to increase the perceived risk 
for an actor. That is, the likelihood of detection and identification is increased, 
potentially reducing the possibility of attack. 
The use of forensics is not limited, however, to deliberately criminal acts. The ability 
to reconstruct some set of transactions allows for an increase in trust for all parties. 
Primarily, it allows for some reasonable expectation that disputes over transactions 
may be solved in something other than an arbitrary manner. Digital forensics provides 
a set of tools to produce information, which can, to some degree of accuracy, 
reconstruct the sequence of events involved in a transaction. This level of surety is 
obviously useful for civil dispute resolution. 
While the behaviour of actors is complex and factors other than those discussed here 
will clearly come into play, this section has outlined one set of advantages to 
providing the ability to undertake forensic investigations in a Web services 
environment. The following section discusses the challenges faced in undertaking 
such investigations. 
Investigative Challenges in Service Oriented 
Architectures 
Given the documented difficulties facing forensic investigations of networks, it seems 
desirable to avoid similar difficulties in forensic investigations of SOAs. A greater 
commonality of interest exists between a service requester and a service provider in 
an SOA transaction than exists in a generic network transaction. This commonality of 
interest should make it easier for both parties to work together to introduce forensic 
systems which will allow them to improve security in service oriented architectures.  
The major issue facing forensic investigations of network systems is the lack of 
relevant evidence collected for the specific purpose of such an investigation. The 
collection of forensic data in networks is, for the most part, an ad hoc process, 
dependent on the likes of firewall logs, intrusion detection system logs, network 
eavesdropper logs, and so on. The scope of data collected from such sources is too 
narrow for many purposes (Shanmugasundaram, Brönnimann and Memon 2005). 
However, in SOAs all major stakeholders have an interest in facilitating the post hoc 
forensic investigation and audit of SOA transactions. There are, nevertheless, a 
number of challenges which confront both the collection of adequate digital evidence 
to facilitate post hoc investigation and the actual post hoc forensic investigation of 
SOAs. These challenges originate from either social or technical considerations. 
Challenges to the actual forensic investigation are mostly technical in nature. 
Challenges to developing the ability to collect adequate data to conduct such an in 
investigation can be both technical and social. 
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Technical Challenges 
Web services are platform independent, which is to say that they are completely 
interoperable irrespective of the network configuration, hardware and software 
employed by the provider and requester. It is this platform independence which poses 
the most obvious technical challenge to a forensic investigation. Each platform 
involved will require a particular set of tools and techniques to be used in evidence 
recovery. This will be especially true of any data collected by an operating system or 
runtime environment specific tool, such as system logs, or by a network monitoring 
tool specific to a certain network configuration, such as firewall logs. Each platform 
has inherent its own issues which can further complicate matters for a forensic 
investigator. For example, the amount of detail in system event logs on Windows 
systems is highly dependent on the auditing configuration of the Windows host 
involved, and the procedure is different altogether on Unix-like systems. Difficulties 
for forensic investigations dependent on the general logging and audit tools provided 
for particular operating systems or platform are likely to persist while Web services 
transactions take place between disparate hosts, configurations and platforms. 
Likewise, the disparity between the information found from the firewall logs, IDS 
logs, and other sensor logs of two different networks is unlikely to be resolved while 
forensic investigations of Web services are dependent on this sort of generic network 
sensor information. 
Forensic systems dependent on eavesdropping tools face a number of difficulties, and 
are vulnerable to deliberate confusion techniques by attackers with obvious interest in 
obscuring their actions. A forensic data collection system dependent on traffic 
interception must be sufficiently “sensitive”, which is to say that it receives all 
messages exchanged between the service provider and requester. It must also be 
“selective”, meaning it rejects spurious data which can make it difficult for 
investigators to recognise data relevant to the investigation. Whilst sensitivity is a 
well-understood requirement, selectivity of traffic sensors in network forensics is 
often misunderstood and thought to be easily achieved through only a token 
evaluation of traffic metadata (Cronin, Sherr and Blaze 2006). The sheer quantity of 
data collected in forensic investigations has been recognised as a challenge which 
confronts researchers and investigators alike. Excessive volumes of data can make the 
search for relevant digital evidence somewhat like searching for a needle in a 
haystack. Solutions to excessive datasets in stand-alone computer forensics include 
datamining (Beebe and Clark 2005) and automated profiling to help narrow the field 
of search (Marrington, Mohay, Clark and Morarji 2007), but it seems that by 
focussing on traffic sensor selectivity, this problem could be largely avoided in SOA 
forensic investigations. Web services are generally stateless from one invocation to 
the next (Zimmerman, Tomlinson and Peuser 2003), meaning that it may not always 
be necessary for SOAP traffic monitoring systems to attempt to keep a record of the 
state of a Web service provider. In the case of certain complex Web services, 
however, it may still be necessary to track the state of each invocation. 
The technical standards which specify the Web services architecture themselves pose 
a challenge to the introduction of forensic data collection into a Web services 
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environment. Within the standards which apply to Web services there is a lack of 
consideration for the collection and storage of digital evidence for the purposes of 
post hoc investigation or auditing. The storage of raw network data is impractical due 
to the high volume of data which would be recorded. The high storage capacity 
requirements of raw network data would introduce excessive expense, or longevity 
concerns, due to the need to overwrite old data to conserve space 
(Shanmugasundaram, Brönnimann and Memon 2005). Storing higher-level data 
would reduce the required storage capacity, thereby allowing the record of a longer 
time period to be maintained. Given the standardised nature of the technologies 
employed in Web services, it should be possible to collect a narrower set of data 
rather than simply collect all network data. As an example, SOAP requests for service 
invocation and the Web service’s SOAP response could be stored, providing 
investigators with the requester’s input and the service’s output. This would allow 
investigators to reconstruct the SOA transaction. 
The solutions to the range of technical challenges described in this section are 
tractable, if daunting. The SOA is not a purely technical system however; social 
influences will play their part. While the ability to gather the required information 
may exist the actual will to do so may not. In the next section we briefly discuss 
possible social challenges which may need to be considered.  
Social Challenges 
For the purposes of this paper we consider social challenges to be problems that arise 
not from a direct technical difficulty but from the parties involved in the use or 
development of the SOA. We consider social problems to be those where a technical 
solution may exist or be capable of development but there is resistance to such 
deployment or development. The possible ways in which social challenges may 
manifest are many and space considerations prevent a comprehensive review. Some 
possible considerations are outlined in this section. 
One difficulty in deciding on how to approach the problem of making provision for 
forensic investigation in SOAs is the difficulty in defining exactly what it is they will 
do. By their very nature SOAs form webs of applications which are put together in an 
ad hoc, as needed basis. Therefore deciding in advance exactly what information is 
involved in an exchange is almost impossible. The unknown nature of the exact 
transactions makes it difficult to decide what may be safe to store or not store or 
indeed what may be required to reconstruct the transaction. It is therefore difficult to 
answer privacy and confidentiality concerns before the actual transaction takes place. 
A company, for example, may wish their use of a certain service to remain 
confidential. The requirement of a forensic investigation that actions may be able to 
be assigned to a fixed party then may become problematic. A challenge then is to 
balance the competing needs of forensic investigations and concerns of the parties 
involved in the transactions. 
For the developers themselves social problems exist. Security measures in general 
have been considered to be an impediment to development of product. Add to this the 
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possibility that extra resources may be required to fulfil the requirement, and 
forensics may then become a source of weakening the business case for the use of 
SOAs in the first place. In concert with these factors, developers may be over-
confident in their ability to produce a completely secure system, reducing impetus to 
facilitate investigation. For example, Oracle’s declaration of an “unbreakable” system 
which proved to be optimistic (Reuters 2001; ComputerWire 2002)54. It is difficult to 
conceive of a system so secure that there exists no possibility of a breach, and where 
that possibility exists then so does the requirement for investigation. 
Finally, there is a potential for conflict between requesters and providers of Web 
services. The use to which information can be put is a topic of growing concern, as 
witnessed by measures in Australia such as the Do Not Call Register (Australian 
Government 2007), and the activities of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
(Office of the Privacy Commissioner). The need that different parties see for forensic 
information may differ and could require different kinds of information. This has the 
potential to cause conflict between what the parties are willing to provide and what is 
necessary to provide. Therefore any definition of information requirements must have 
means for conflict resolution. 
This section has outlined potential social impediments to implementing a 
comprehensive system for carrying out forensic examinations in SOAs. Having 
described technical and social challenges to such a system and defining, at least in 
part, the desirability of such a system the next section will define what the 
requirements for a framework are likely to be. 
The Need for a Framework 
The standards-driven nature of Web services in particular, and service oriented 
architectures generally, provides an opportunity to incorporate forensic data 
collection standards as an intrinsic part of SOAs. Providing for forensic data 
collection in a standardised form has benefits for an investigation. These benefits 
include greater efficiency through similarity in the process of discovering digital 
evidence, and greater confidence in the quality of that digital evidence. We therefore 
propose that a framework to support forensic investigations be incorporated into the 
standards which govern SOAs. 
Standardising forensic data collection in SOAs would address the challenges 
discussed earlier through the process of establishing a standard as an industry, and by 
providing a mechanism for the parties in an SOA transaction to negotiate what 
information would be recorded. The process of expanding existing SOA standards or 
writing new ones to accommodate forensic data collection would necessitate 
enumerating the concerns of legitimate SOA participants. These concerns could be 
evaluated from the perspectives of all involved parties, and a middle ground could be 
determined which was in the common interest. Such a standard could also incorporate 
                                                     
54 The number of cases are many, the Oracle example simply being a high-profile case. 
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a “handshaking” stage, at which both the service requester and the service provider 
would agree to the amount of information stored about a service invocation. If the 
parties could not agree on a required level of identifying information the invocation 
request could be rejected. The introduction of such a stage would mean that both 
parties had to find a mutually agreeable level of information which could be recorded 
about the transaction before that transaction took place. 
If forensic data collection were to become part of the standards-mandated framework 
for SOAs, any potential competitive disadvantage to conducting such data collection 
would be eliminated. While building the capacity to collect forensic data about SOA 
transactions remains optional, providers who choose not to implement such measures 
may enjoy a competitive advantage, especially in time-to-market terms. Such an 
advantage is gained at the expense of the overall security posture of the system, which 
could have repercussions for the service provider’s clients. Without the capacity for 
forensic data collection being included in an accepted standard, potential customers 
have no capacity to build confidence in the security of a given service. The 
incorporation of forensic data collection systems into SOA standards would level the 
playing field between all service providers. 
A forensic data collection system for SOAs must include a sensor and a log for the 
monitoring and storage of messages. As investigations into SOAs will primarily 
concern higher-level application logic (e.g. the details of a service invocation) rather 
than lower-level network traffic, every piece of network traffic need not be monitored 
and recorded. It may be desirable to allow configuration as to which messages are 
logged, in-line with privacy or other concerns. The sensor must be placed logically 
within the SOA to intercept incoming SOAP messages prior to their processing, as 
well as outgoing SOAP messages. The sensor should not process message payloads, it 
should merely record them in the log. Many attacks on SOAs consist of messages 
with payloads containing attack code, or which are over-sized and take an excessively 
long period of time to parse. For example, Web services are vulnerable to attacks 
which cause a denial of service by providing well-formed XML documents to a 
service which are oversized or contain excessive nesting of elements (Singhal and 
Winograd 2006). Yu categorises just under 60% of attacks against Web services and 
applications as “input manipulation” attacks, which prey on processing an attacker’s 
input (Yu, Aravind and Supthaweesuk 2006). In order to avoid the forensic data 
collection system failing to record or even being brought down by the very sorts of 
attacks it is supposed to help investigate, its sensor must record messages in its log 
prior to any processing of the message’s content. 
A framework to support the post hoc forensic investigation of service oriented 
architectures can be established through the incorporation of forensic data collection 
into SOA standards. Such a framework needs to ensure that such a forensic data 
collection system provides continuous service even during attacks on the SOA. It can 
provide a mechanism for the parties involved in an SOA transaction to negotiate 
about the level of information to be stored about the transaction. A standardised 
framework would make forensic investigations more efficient, and raise consumer 
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confidence in SOA security. We propose the adoption of a standards-driven 
framework for data collection to facilitate forensic investigations of SOAs. 
Conclusion 
This paper has discussed the value of facilitating post hoc forensic investigations of 
service oriented architectures. The challenges, both technical and social, which hold 
back the integration of data collection mechanisms to facilitate such investigations 
have been identified. It is clear that, in some form, these challenges will need to be 
overcome. It will be necessary to undertake investigations on service oriented 
architectures; the question is how effective, in costs and accuracy such investigations 
can be. By including provision in the standards for effective methods of collecting 
and maintaining forensically significant information the extra effort required will be 
the same for all parties. It will also allow the implications of such requirements to be 
considered before the urgency of an immediate need may make for ill-considered 
decisions. The integration of forensic requirements in the underlying standards will 
also allow for the most efficient means to be defined and implemented. Future 
considerations will include; the finer grained details of the actual information 
requirements, how these requirements may be best integrated with SOAs in general 
and which mechanisms may be put in place to secure such information. As the SOA 
space matures and develops it is essential that our ability to provide investigative and 
assurance services expand simultaneously.  
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